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jcmargesonDomestic Politics and Egypt’s Nuclear Restraint
Posted by mhealey04 on October 20, 2008
Given the security landscape of the Middle East, Egypt was seen as a prime candidate for nuclear proliferation in the 1960s-70s. Yet, despite intermittent efforts to build a nuclear weapons capacity, Egypt has repeatedly shown nuclear restraint. Its failure to build the bomb remains a puzzle for proliferation experts and International Relations scholars. A more nuanced look into the domestic politics of Egypt, however, reveals a military with latent political power. This relationship, which developed through a series of actions taken in the run-up to and aftermath of the 1967 War, has compelled the political elite to block efforts to build a weapons capacity. In short, the domestic political decisions that were made under Nasser and Sadat have created a situation that induces the Egyptian regime to forego the nuclear weapons option while showering the military with incentives at the expense of the civilian population. What implications does this relationship have for Egyptian and regional security? Should U.S. policy be adjusted to reflect (or exploit) this cleavage in Egyptian civil-military relations?
John Margeson said
This is a really great article that touches on a potential outlier in traditional realist conceptions of security. One would imagine that a major power in Middle East international politics would see it necessary to have a nuclear deterrent, especially when it has been involved in two conflicts on its border and was the victim of preemptive attack. You ask the question, “Should U.S. policy be adjusted accordingly” but I’m wondering if U.S. policy is part of the problem. Could an argument be made that the American security umbrella guarantees Egypt’s security as much as it guarantees Israel’s security? If so, this would make it prudent for Egypt to build a sound conventional military while forgoing the label of “nuclear power.” Without nuclear weapons, it is free to conduct conventional wars leaving Israel (presumably the only nuclear power in the region) to decide if they wish to be the first state since WWII to respond to a threat with nuclear attack. Regardless, Egypt’s case is a very interesting situation and counter-intuitive in many ways.
mhealey04 said
Thanks John for your feedback. Your question regarding whether or not the American security umbrella guarantees Egypt’s security as much as it does Israel is an interesting line of thought. However, in this article, I was primarily concerned with the time period starting when Egypt became aware of Israel’s nuclear program (a matter of debate but certainly by 1961) and ending with the Camp David accords. In that time frame, prior to 1979, Egypt had no security guarantee from the U.S. and even after the signing of the Peace Treaty, the U.S. is not required to commit forces to Egypt’s defense. Prior to 1979, Egypt should have built a bomb by security argument standards, and even after 1979, I think most Egyptians felt (and still feel) that the U.S. would ultimately favor Israel in a war between the two countries. The domestic political decisions made under Nasser and Sadat, however, led Egypt down the path to signing the NPT in 1981. Now, the NPT is not an ironclad agreement, and its clout has certainly withered over the years, but it added another restraining influence over the Egyptian regime.
Looking to the future, the U.S. has thus far been hesitant to tie any of its Egyptian foreign aid (approximately $1.3 billion annually) to political or economic reforms. Partly, the U.S. is keen on maintaining good relations with Egypt in the war on terror. Partly, the U.S. doesn’t want to push for reforms because they are afraid of who would win an election, i.e. Muslim Brotherhood. My own feeling is that the U.S. lacks a nuanced understanding of the tenuous relationship between the military and the regime in Egypt. As the US-led ‘war on terror’ morphs into something more akin to a global counterterrorism campaign, Egypt’s importance from the early days after 9/11 will diminish and at some point in the not so distant future, Egypt will face a regime change – Mubarak is approaching 80. The MB will by no means be a staunch US ally, but they have shown themselves to be a practical player in politics. While fringe movements still foment violent, they are largely a mainstream political movement and if elected to power, would still have to deal with the same constraints outlined in this paper. It may be time for the US to take a long-term strategic look towards Egypt and forego the short-term rewards that an autocrat provides.