Comments on: Domestic Politics and Egypt’s Nuclear Restraint http://journalsis.wordpress.com/2008/10/20/domestic-politics-and-egypts-nuclear-restraint/ how we see it Sun, 08 Feb 2009 01:43:08 +0000 http://wordpress.com/ hourly 1 By: mhealey04 http://journalsis.wordpress.com/2008/10/20/domestic-politics-and-egypts-nuclear-restraint/#comment-10 mhealey04 Tue, 28 Oct 2008 18:41:51 +0000 http://journalsis.wordpress.com/?p=44#comment-10 Thanks John for your feedback. Your question regarding whether or not the American security umbrella guarantees Egypt's security as much as it does Israel is an interesting line of thought. However, in this article, I was primarily concerned with the time period starting when Egypt became aware of Israel's nuclear program (a matter of debate but certainly by 1961) and ending with the Camp David accords. In that time frame, prior to 1979, Egypt had no security guarantee from the U.S. and even after the signing of the Peace Treaty, the U.S. is not required to commit forces to Egypt's defense. Prior to 1979, Egypt should have built a bomb by security argument standards, and even after 1979, I think most Egyptians felt (and still feel) that the U.S. would ultimately favor Israel in a war between the two countries. The domestic political decisions made under Nasser and Sadat, however, led Egypt down the path to signing the NPT in 1981. Now, the NPT is not an ironclad agreement, and its clout has certainly withered over the years, but it added another restraining influence over the Egyptian regime. Looking to the future, the U.S. has thus far been hesitant to tie any of its Egyptian foreign aid (approximately $1.3 billion annually) to political or economic reforms. Partly, the U.S. is keen on maintaining good relations with Egypt in the war on terror. Partly, the U.S. doesn't want to push for reforms because they are afraid of who would win an election, i.e. Muslim Brotherhood. My own feeling is that the U.S. lacks a nuanced understanding of the tenuous relationship between the military and the regime in Egypt. As the US-led 'war on terror' morphs into something more akin to a global counterterrorism campaign, Egypt's importance from the early days after 9/11 will diminish and at some point in the not so distant future, Egypt will face a regime change - Mubarak is approaching 80. The MB will by no means be a staunch US ally, but they have shown themselves to be a practical player in politics. While fringe movements still foment violent, they are largely a mainstream political movement and if elected to power, would still have to deal with the same constraints outlined in this paper. It may be time for the US to take a long-term strategic look towards Egypt and forego the short-term rewards that an autocrat provides. Thanks John for your feedback. Your question regarding whether or not the American security umbrella guarantees Egypt’s security as much as it does Israel is an interesting line of thought. However, in this article, I was primarily concerned with the time period starting when Egypt became aware of Israel’s nuclear program (a matter of debate but certainly by 1961) and ending with the Camp David accords. In that time frame, prior to 1979, Egypt had no security guarantee from the U.S. and even after the signing of the Peace Treaty, the U.S. is not required to commit forces to Egypt’s defense. Prior to 1979, Egypt should have built a bomb by security argument standards, and even after 1979, I think most Egyptians felt (and still feel) that the U.S. would ultimately favor Israel in a war between the two countries. The domestic political decisions made under Nasser and Sadat, however, led Egypt down the path to signing the NPT in 1981. Now, the NPT is not an ironclad agreement, and its clout has certainly withered over the years, but it added another restraining influence over the Egyptian regime.

Looking to the future, the U.S. has thus far been hesitant to tie any of its Egyptian foreign aid (approximately $1.3 billion annually) to political or economic reforms. Partly, the U.S. is keen on maintaining good relations with Egypt in the war on terror. Partly, the U.S. doesn’t want to push for reforms because they are afraid of who would win an election, i.e. Muslim Brotherhood. My own feeling is that the U.S. lacks a nuanced understanding of the tenuous relationship between the military and the regime in Egypt. As the US-led ‘war on terror’ morphs into something more akin to a global counterterrorism campaign, Egypt’s importance from the early days after 9/11 will diminish and at some point in the not so distant future, Egypt will face a regime change – Mubarak is approaching 80. The MB will by no means be a staunch US ally, but they have shown themselves to be a practical player in politics. While fringe movements still foment violent, they are largely a mainstream political movement and if elected to power, would still have to deal with the same constraints outlined in this paper. It may be time for the US to take a long-term strategic look towards Egypt and forego the short-term rewards that an autocrat provides.

]]> By: John Margeson http://journalsis.wordpress.com/2008/10/20/domestic-politics-and-egypts-nuclear-restraint/#comment-8 John Margeson Mon, 27 Oct 2008 01:52:52 +0000 http://journalsis.wordpress.com/?p=44#comment-8 This is a really great article that touches on a potential outlier in traditional realist conceptions of security. One would imagine that a major power in Middle East international politics would see it necessary to have a nuclear deterrent, especially when it has been involved in two conflicts on its border and was the victim of preemptive attack. You ask the question, "Should U.S. policy be adjusted accordingly" but I'm wondering if U.S. policy is part of the problem. Could an argument be made that the American security umbrella guarantees Egypt's security as much as it guarantees Israel's security? If so, this would make it prudent for Egypt to build a sound conventional military while forgoing the label of "nuclear power." Without nuclear weapons, it is free to conduct conventional wars leaving Israel (presumably the only nuclear power in the region) to decide if they wish to be the first state since WWII to respond to a threat with nuclear attack. Regardless, Egypt's case is a very interesting situation and counter-intuitive in many ways. This is a really great article that touches on a potential outlier in traditional realist conceptions of security. One would imagine that a major power in Middle East international politics would see it necessary to have a nuclear deterrent, especially when it has been involved in two conflicts on its border and was the victim of preemptive attack. You ask the question, “Should U.S. policy be adjusted accordingly” but I’m wondering if U.S. policy is part of the problem. Could an argument be made that the American security umbrella guarantees Egypt’s security as much as it guarantees Israel’s security? If so, this would make it prudent for Egypt to build a sound conventional military while forgoing the label of “nuclear power.” Without nuclear weapons, it is free to conduct conventional wars leaving Israel (presumably the only nuclear power in the region) to decide if they wish to be the first state since WWII to respond to a threat with nuclear attack. Regardless, Egypt’s case is a very interesting situation and counter-intuitive in many ways.

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