Domestic Politics and Egypt’s Nuclear Restraint

Given the security landscape of the Middle East, Egypt was seen as a prime candidate for nuclear proliferation in the 1960s-70s. Yet, despite intermittent efforts to build a nuclear weapons capacity, Egypt has repeatedly shown nuclear restraint. Its failure to build the bomb remains a puzzle for proliferation experts and International Relations scholars. A more nuanced look into the domestic politics of Egypt, however, reveals a military with latent political power. This relationship, which developed through a series of actions taken in the run-up to and aftermath of the 1967 War, has compelled the political elite to block efforts to build a weapons capacity. In short, the domestic political decisions that were made under Nasser and Sadat have created a situation that induces the Egyptian regime to forego the nuclear weapons option while showering the military with incentives at the expense of the civilian population. What implications does this relationship have for Egyptian and regional security? Should U.S. policy be adjusted to reflect (or exploit) this cleavage in Egyptian civil-military relations?