Comments for Journal of International Service

Comment on Economic Crisis: The Fragility of “Normalcy” by jcmargeson

jcmargeson — Sun, 08 Feb 2009 01:43:08 +0000

I have to ask a relatively ignorant question; I’m not an economist. What about the argument that, since the credit crisis started here the stimulus should be injected into the American economy as directly as possible? Wouldn’t allowing the finds percolate into other economies diffuse the impact and negate the intended effect?

Comment on Economic Crisis: The Fragility of “Normalcy” by whodan2

whodan2 — Sun, 01 Feb 2009 00:54:24 +0000

On protectionism:
Someone has to consistently argue against protectionism in order to keep that opinion in the mix. Obviously not all policy recommendations have been anti-protectionist–witness the recent House-version stimulus bill’s “buy American” requirements for steel and other basic commodities. Such requirements wouldn’t have made it without someone recommending they be there. The myriad interests we as a country have in maintaining domestic capacity in certain sectors will certainly overwhelm anti-protectionist arguments on the whole, but those arguments need to be there to encourage us not to become overly-protectionist–a balance must be struck.

Comment on 21st Century Pirates by Miguel

Miguel — Wed, 03 Dec 2008 21:40:40 +0000

I think the idea of 21st century pirates is wonderful. It’s probably only a matter of time before we see marines clashing with these swashbucklers. I would put agent Jack Bauer on the case.

Comment on Domestic Politics and Egypt’s Nuclear Restraint by mhealey04

mhealey04 — Tue, 28 Oct 2008 18:41:51 +0000

Thanks John for your feedback. Your question regarding whether or not the American security umbrella guarantees Egypt’s security as much as it does Israel is an interesting line of thought. However, in this article, I was primarily concerned with the time period starting when Egypt became aware of Israel’s nuclear program (a matter of debate but certainly by 1961) and ending with the Camp David accords. In that time frame, prior to 1979, Egypt had no security guarantee from the U.S. and even after the signing of the Peace Treaty, the U.S. is not required to commit forces to Egypt’s defense. Prior to 1979, Egypt should have built a bomb by security argument standards, and even after 1979, I think most Egyptians felt (and still feel) that the U.S. would ultimately favor Israel in a war between the two countries. The domestic political decisions made under Nasser and Sadat, however, led Egypt down the path to signing the NPT in 1981. Now, the NPT is not an ironclad agreement, and its clout has certainly withered over the years, but it added another restraining influence over the Egyptian regime.

Looking to the future, the U.S. has thus far been hesitant to tie any of its Egyptian foreign aid (approximately $1.3 billion annually) to political or economic reforms. Partly, the U.S. is keen on maintaining good relations with Egypt in the war on terror. Partly, the U.S. doesn’t want to push for reforms because they are afraid of who would win an election, i.e. Muslim Brotherhood. My own feeling is that the U.S. lacks a nuanced understanding of the tenuous relationship between the military and the regime in Egypt. As the US-led ‘war on terror’ morphs into something more akin to a global counterterrorism campaign, Egypt’s importance from the early days after 9/11 will diminish and at some point in the not so distant future, Egypt will face a regime change – Mubarak is approaching 80. The MB will by no means be a staunch US ally, but they have shown themselves to be a practical player in politics. While fringe movements still foment violent, they are largely a mainstream political movement and if elected to power, would still have to deal with the same constraints outlined in this paper. It may be time for the US to take a long-term strategic look towards Egypt and forego the short-term rewards that an autocrat provides.

Comment on Domestic Politics and Egypt’s Nuclear Restraint by John Margeson

John Margeson — Mon, 27 Oct 2008 01:52:52 +0000

This is a really great article that touches on a potential outlier in traditional realist conceptions of security. One would imagine that a major power in Middle East international politics would see it necessary to have a nuclear deterrent, especially when it has been involved in two conflicts on its border and was the victim of preemptive attack. You ask the question, “Should U.S. policy be adjusted accordingly” but I’m wondering if U.S. policy is part of the problem. Could an argument be made that the American security umbrella guarantees Egypt’s security as much as it guarantees Israel’s security? If so, this would make it prudent for Egypt to build a sound conventional military while forgoing the label of “nuclear power.” Without nuclear weapons, it is free to conduct conventional wars leaving Israel (presumably the only nuclear power in the region) to decide if they wish to be the first state since WWII to respond to a threat with nuclear attack. Regardless, Egypt’s case is a very interesting situation and counter-intuitive in many ways.

Comment on Implications of Russian Energy Development – A Policy Brief by jcmargeson

jcmargeson — Thu, 23 Oct 2008 16:35:50 +0000

Another element of the energy investment in countries that are net-exporters of petroleum is that exploration and development of new fields of oil and gas is stagnant. This is especially true in Russia and Central Asia. Maps of areas where initial searches have been performed to find new fields look like a they’re “freckled” with pockets of petroleum. An argument can be made that Russia isn’t sufficiently capitalized or “free market” friendly enough to unleash smaller developers on these fields. I also wonder if Russia also benefits from the perception of dwindling resources with scarcity maintaining a certain levity in the price.

Comment on Implications of Russian Energy Development – A Policy Brief by emily hersh

emily hersh — Thu, 16 Oct 2008 15:31:14 +0000

This brief contains many elements highly relevant in the current credit crunch, and begs the question of how integrated into the global capitalist system Russia is. Investments in infrastructure generally are undertaken by the government, who can then contract work out with private organizations if it seems fit. Infrastructure development does not regularly occur outside the public sector because returns are not realized for quite a longer period of time than other investments, and benefits tend to be dispersed (think roads, public transportation, street lights, etc). In the current investment climate, mobilizing the necessary capital for large projects may be unfeasible. Contrarily, large-scale government projects focused on infrastructure development are continuing apparently undaunted in other oil-exporting nations such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Because these nations have relatively nontransparent financial sectors, it is difficult to predict what the effects of the global financial crisis will be, especially in the way large-scale government projects.